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chapter [ ]  
Use and abuse of competition law in pursuit of the 
single market – has competition law served a 
quasi-industrial policy agenda? 
 
Abstract  
 
The call for an enhanced role for industrial policy has traditionally been 
relegated to the furthest reaches of the competition law universe and has 
received limited support. Accordingly it has been assumed that industrial policy 
has not influenced the Commission’s priorities when enforcing competition law. 
However, as is often the case, the reality is more complex. In pursuit of the single 
market, competition law has sometimes played a regulatory role with a flavour 
of industrial policy. Hence, it would be too simplistic to deny that industrial 
policy considerations are advanced under competition law if a broader definition 
is applied. 
 
While it is not entirely clear what governs the understanding and application of 
competition law,1 industrial policy in the form of government intervention in the 
market to correct imperfections and facilitate structural changes as part of a larger 
plan is not normally considered to be part.2 Further, as there has been no serious call 
for change from outside the ranks of a limited number of politicians, it may 
reasonably be argued that there is not and should not be scope for an industrial policy 
agenda as part of competition law. From an overall perspective this argument appears 
correct as there is no significant example of the Commission turning a blind eye to 
serious impediments to competition for industrial policy reasons or giving in to such 
pressure.3 On the other hand, to argue that only economic welfare arguments have 
been made and accepted under competition law would be equally problematic, as 
there are too many examples of exceptions to this.4 Over the years a pattern has 
emerged whereby, in the absence of satisfactory single market regulation, the 
Commission has occasionally resorted to competition law in order to secure single 
market objectives. Further, what is satisfactory regulation in the eyes of the 
Commission should not be confused with actual regulation or the opinions of the 
Member States and the Council. This is a significant reservation, as there are 
examples of competition law being used as part of a wider and more political agenda 
 
1
 For the purposes of this paper ‘competition law’ includes Articles 101, 102 and 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) and the applicable Merger Regulations, currently Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). 
2
 There is no authoritative definition of ‘industrial policy’ available; see Luis Navarro Industrial policy in the economic 
literature. Recent theoretical developments and implications for EU policy, Enterprise paper 12 DG Enterprise 2003 
available on the internet. Hence, ‘industrial policy’ can have many meanings including ‘picking the winning strategies’, 
creating ‘national champions’ through protectionism, and promoting innovation and development by public 
investments in R&D etc. However, most of definitions include some form of restructuring of sectors and industries in 
accordance with a ‘master plan’. 
3
 For possible examples of both see Damien Geradin & Ianis Girgenson Industrial Policy and European Merger 
Control - A reassessment, available on the internet. 
4
 See Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & Nicolas Petit, EU competition law and economics, Oxford 2012, points 
1.70 to 1.72. 
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with some flavour of industrial policy. Consequently if considered in more detail, and 
if the concept of industrial policy is taken as including any larger restructuring of 
sectors and industries for the attainment of long term objectives, it could be argued 
that competition law has occasionally played a regulatory role as part of a quasi-
industrial policy agenda. These observations relate mainly to the sectors liberalised 
from the 1980s on, though they are not limited to these. Thus, there is a need for a 
more detailed understanding of the interaction between competition law and single 
market regulation. This understanding should take account of the fact that while 
industrial policy has not been directly or officially embraced as part of competition 
law, its fingerprints may nevertheless be discerned. The aim of this contribution is to 
examine the role of industrial policy in competition law. 
1. The fundamentals of competition law and single market regulation 
While competition law has traditionally been concerned with enhancing economic 
welfare, and consumer welfare in particular,5 regardless of whether it takes the form 
of directives or regulations, single market regulation is perceived as pursuing a wider 
agenda with the main aim of creating the single market is the predominant. This could 
and should involve correcting market failures and their underlying causes as well as 
any other elements that are undesirable from a Union perspective. Thus, regulation of 
the single market often concerns the very core of industrial policy. Any such agenda 
would therefore normally be pursued within the framework of the single market and 
its associated regulation and would depend on the support of the relevant legislative 
bodies and, in contrast to competition law, would be subject to few restrictions in the 
scope.  
 
There is a core of overlap between competition law and single market regulation, 
whether broad or narrow, as unrestricted competition could be an objective or 
instrument under both. In addition, being linked to economic theories and paradigms, 
competition law evolves over time, often in parallel with changes to other regulatory 
theories, thereby mitigating the differences as neither set of laws is static. On the 
other hand there are also many objectives of the single market, including opening up 
and deregulating markets, which fall outside the scope of competition law despite 
their being a precondition for meaningful competition. A market that is without 
competition because of the existence of monopoly rights would offer little role for 
competition law. Competition law is e.g. perceived as being less well suited than 
sector-specific single market regulation for tailoring specific obligations and 
remedies.6 A traditional perception of the interaction between competition law, single 
market regulation and any implied industrial policy agenda would be that single 
market regulation paves the way for competition law and mitigates any socially 
undesirable consequences of unrestricted competition. Further, this process is of an 
essentially industrial political nature as it is based on a presumption of giving long-
term gains in economic welfare. However, competition law come into play when 
there is competition, ensuring that private restrictions do not replace government 
restrictions.  
 
5
 See Giorgio Monti EC Competition Law, Cambridge 2007, p. 20; and the speech by Commissioner Neelie Kroes - 
SPEECH/05/512 – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices, European Consumer and Competition Day. 
6
 This is the general perception, which could be challenged but which nevertheless has some validity since competition 
law operates ex post and emphasises general principles and is thus less well positioned to provide for prudent, 
predictable and well tailored remedies in a transitional phase. 
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1.1. A traditional perception sees limited interaction 
Most scholars focus either on competition law or on single market regulation, paying 
limited attention to any overlap between them. There is some logic to this, as single 
market regulation is normally addressed to the Member States while competition law 
is primarily addressed to undertakings. While single market regulation can concern 
anything that is subject to Union law, competition law must be confined to certain 
defined objectives, primarily to do with economic welfare. However, to ignore the 
overlap or to fail to understand how single market regulation must be defined with 
respect for competition law would be to fundamentally neglect the secondary nature 
of single market regulation and its subordination to primary law, in this case 
competition law. As demonstrated as early as in Grundig Consten,7 (1966), 
competition law can be used to prevent the use of national law (in this case on IP 
rights) to partition the single market.8 This is normally a role played by single market 
regulation. Hence, in contrast to the traditional perception that there is limited 
interaction between single market regulation and competition law, it is apparent that 
single market regulation does apply within the area of competition law and potentially 
could be “corrected” by the latter in the event of a substantive conflict. Thus the 
traditional view, that there is limited interaction between single market regulation and 
competition law and that there is no industrial policy agenda associated with 
competition law, does not tell the whole story. 
1.2. In pursuit of a more elaborate interaction and relationship  
The interaction between single market regulation and competition law was developed 
further in France v Commission,9 (1982) which is another early example of 
competition law being used to make up for shortcomings in single market regulation. 
In this case, pursuant to Article 106(3) TFEU the Commission directed the Member 
States to disclose their financial transactions with public undertakings in order to 
prevent unlawful State aid. This requirement may have been reasonable from a Union 
perspective but it nevertheless found little support in some of the Member States and 
was unsuccessfully challenged by them before the Court of Justice. However, once it 
was confirmed that the Commission had powers to adopt Commission directives, by-
passing the Council, such directives became an effective instrument for dealing with 
recalcitrant Member States. In the hands of a self-confident Commission in the 1980s, 
Commission directives proved very potent in redefining the role of competition law. 
In the 1980s even more wide ranging initiatives were taken to liberalise a number of 
sectors, of which the telecommunications sector was the most prominent. While 
normally associated with the Commission Green Paper10 of 1987 and its subsequent 
implementation from 1990 onwards, the foundations were in fact laid in 1982 with 
 
7
 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 - Établissements Consten and Grundig v Commission, English special edition, ECR 299. 
8
 As explained below, this case predates the development of the Union exhaustion of rights doctrine leaving 
competition law as the only readily available instrument.  
9
 Joined Cases 188 to 190/80 France, Italy and UK v Commission [1982] ECR 2545. 
10
 COM 1987 290 - Towards a dynamic European economy, Green Paper on the development of the common market 
for telecommunications services and equipment. 
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British Telecommunications.11 In this case, British Telecom’s restriction of access to 
call-back arrangements, aimed at leveraging its dominant position in the UK to a 
liberalised market, was held to be in breach of Article 102 TFEU. The Commission’s 
ruling was appealed to the Court of Justice by a group of reluctant Member States 
rather than by the undertakings directly affected, but the Court of Justice upheld the 
ruling. While they are not officially related, it is possible to see a link between the 
outcome of British Telecom and France v Commission and the Green Paper which 
recommended ending the unrestricted use of exclusive rights. If for no other reason 
than that it seems unlikely that the Commission would be willing to step into the ring 
for another round with the Member States following a knockout blow in the first 
round.12 It is therefore possible to see an active role for competition law in the 
deregulation process embarked on in EU from the 1980s, and thus also an underlying 
industrial policy agenda for competition law. Also, following France v Commission 
the Commission had been given a powerful instrument in competition law, which did 
not require consent of the Member States. 
 
2. A multiple role for competition law in the single market 
The prevailing pattern indicates not only that there is a close interaction between the 
rules and objectives of competition law and single market regulation, but also shows 
how competition law is at least indirectly influenced by single market considerations. 
Moreover, this influence indicates how, in its interaction with single market 
regulation, competition law can give different forms of support for single market 
regulation. It appears that no fewer than three positions can be identified, whereby 
competition law: 
 
1. supplements single market regulation and vice versa, 
2. is the rock upon which the single market and its regulation is built, and 
3. drives the development of the single market and its regulation.  
 
While the line between these positions may not be clear cut, what is clear is that these 
positions indicate that there is a more elaborate interaction than is traditionally 
perceived and that competition law has been used to promote single market objectives 
and has in fact been shaped by this. This challenges the assumption that there is no 
industry policy agenda in competition law and indicates the existence of a broader 
agenda than the traditional assumption of economic welfare. These positions will be 
developed further below. As noted, the lines between these positions are not entirely 
clear so that it is difficult to avoid some of overlap between them. 
3. Competition law as a supplement to single market regulation 
In the traditional view, depending on the level of single market regulation most 
undertakings would tend to focus either on competition law or on compliance with 
single market regulation and limit their interest in the other accordingly. 
Consequently, undertakings often find it surprising that they cannot confine 
 
11
 Case IV/29.877 - British Telecommunications (OJ 1982 L 360/36). This decision was upheld by the Court of Justice 
in Case C-41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873. 
12
 A more formal and direct link is identified by Susanne K Schmidt, ‘Sterile Debates and Dubious Generalisations: 
European Integration Theory Tested by Telecommunications and Electricity’, 16 Journal of Public Policy 1997, p. 243. 
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themselves to complying with their obligations under sector-specific regulation but 
must also take competition law into account. Grundig Consten is an early example of 
a situation where IP rights granted under national law were considered incompatible 
with the single market and were ‘corrected’ under competition law. While the 
development of the doctrine of the exhaustion of IP rights13 has filled the gap 
identified in Grundig Consten, and while single market regulation has filled other 
gaps, these do not render the role of competition law obsolete. This was demonstrated 
in Deutsche Telekom,14 (2003) where abuse of a dominant position by imposition of a 
margin squeeze was found to be in breach of Article 102 TFEU, though single market 
regulation was intended to prevent it.15 Furthermore, the undertaking involved 
(Deutsche Telekom) failed in its argument that its conduct was not a breach of the 
Treaty on the grounds that it had applied wholesale prices that were supervised and 
approved by the national telecoms regulator in accordance with sector-specific single 
market regulation. The argument was that compliance with single market regulation 
should give immunity from proceedings for breach of competition law and that any 
misconduct dealt with by the regulator involved and the Member State. Deutsche 
Telecom’s argument was not persuasive as its wholesale price exceeded the retail 
price, making the margin squeeze infringement obvious to all, apart from Deutsche 
Telekom apparently. The General Court also noted that the regulator had acted on the 
suggestions of Deutsche Telekom,16 effectively allowing Deutsche Telekom to set its 
prices independently of the regulator and ultimately squeeze competitors’ margins. 
On the other hand, Deutsche Telekom’s argument was not entirely invalid as the 
established principles also would be applicable when the disparity between the 
wholesale and retail prices, and the regulatory failings, is less obvious. Thus, 
undertakings which operate in closely regulated sectors are required to adhere to two 
sets of regulations and regulators and, due to the overlaps in their fields of interest 
approval by one regulator does not exclude intervention by the other. Not a 
particularly practical set of obligations in particular if the regulators fail to coordinate 
their approach. 
 
Grundig Consten and Deutsche Telekom are not isolated examples of competition law 
being used to correct regulatory shortcomings. There are similar examples in 
Flughafen Frankfurt17 (1998) and Verbändevereinbarung18 (1998). In the first case, 
Frankfurt Airport’s attempt to reserve certain ground handling services was found to 
be contrary to the single market regulation,19 which allowed either self-handling or 
third party sourcing. The airport nevertheless tried to get round the regulation by 
making contractual arrangements, leading to the Commission taking action pursuant 
to Article 102 TFEU.20 Verbändevereinbarung concerned a horizontal industry 
agreement on tariffs for access to the German electricity grid. An agreement that 
despite being a (hardcore) horizontal price cartel could nevertheless be accepted as 
 
13
 See Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 2005, pp. 585-588. 
14
 Case T-271/03 - Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2008] ECR II-477; see paras. 70-71 and 151. This decision was 
appealed to and upheld by the Court of Justice in Case C-280/08P Deutsche Telekom [2010] ECR I-9555.  
15
 See Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, recital 11.  
16
 See Case-T 271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2008] ECR II-477, paras. 37 and 122. 
17
 Case IV/34.801 - FAG - Flughafen Frankfurt/Main. See paras. 103-105 for further on the single market regulation 
and the shortcomings related to incorrect national implementation. 
18
 The Commission’s XXVIII Report on Competition Policy (1998), pp. 156-159. 
19
 Directive 96/67/EC on access to the groundhandling market at Community airports (OJ 1996 L 272/36). 
20
 See also case COMP/38.745 - BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG for another example of competition law being used to 
prevent national regulation inducing discriminatory abuse to frustrate the single market. 
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the Directive in question21 specifically referred access related questions to 
commercial negotiations rather than regulation. Presumably concluding that the 
agreement was less than perfect but better than nothing, the Commission decided not 
to pursue the matter further, taking the somewhat unusual step under Article 101 
TFEU of not adopting a decision. Recent cases, such as Microsoft22 (2007) and 
Football Association Premier League,23 (2011) also fit into this pattern. In the 
Microsoft case the Commission originally argued that the obligation to provide the 
disputed information was regulated by Directive24 compelling Microsoft to provide 
these directly. In Football Association Premier League the Court of Justice concluded 
that, by preventing pubs from entering into agreements with foreign television 
broadcasters, the owner of IP rights had upset the delicate balance of interests 
established by single market regulations.25 Consequently, they were in principle 
breaching single market regulation rather than competition law. However, it was the 
latter that was called into service in the case. There have been many cases where 
national and geographical discrimination has been addressed under competition law, 
including United Brands,26  British Leyland,27 Irish Sugar,28 PO/World Cup 1998,29 
and Portugal v Commission.30 Across a wide range of activities, such as the sale of 
fruit, cars, air transport, sugar and sport/leisure, discriminatory practices that have 
favoured domestic consumers and undertakings or have prevented parallel trade have 
been considered incompatible with the single market and in breach of Article 102 
TFEU. As expressed by the General Court in Irish Sugar,31 these practices ran 
contrary to the “…essence of a common market…” by creating obstacles to the single 
market. However, few economic welfare arguments can be made in support of an 
absolute prohibition of geographical discrimination,32 so that single market regulation 
is a better solution. Recently this doctrine has been applied to alleged abuses of the IP 
system, involving artificial extensions of patents by unmeritorious applications and 
misrepresentations,33 ‘patent ambush’34 and ‘sham litigation’.35 All these situations 
involve different levels of regulatory shortcomings, either in the legislation, or in 
enforcement of the legislation by Member States,36 or both. 
 
21
 Article 17 of Directive 1996/92/EC on common rules for the internal market in electricity allowed the Member 
States to regulate the allocation of grid access or to refer the issue to commercial negotiation. In its implementation of 
the Directive Germany had chosen the latter option. 
22
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
23
 Joined Cases C-403/08 and 429/08 Football Association Premier League [2011] ECR 0000.  
24
 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 - Microsoft, paras. 743-763 referring to Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal 
protection of computer programs. 
25
 See paras. 104-108, 114-117, 121 and 138-139. 
26
 Case C-27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, paras 204-234. 
27
 Case C-226/84 British Leyland v Commission [1986] ECR 3263. 
28
 Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR II-2969. 
29
 Case IV/36.888 - PO/World Cup 1998. 
30
 Case C-163/99 Portugal v Commission [2001] ECR I-2613. 
31
 Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR 1999 II-2969, para. 185. 
32
 For further see Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, Price Discrimination Under EC Competition Law: The Need for a 
case-by-case Approach, Global Competition Law Centre Working Paper Series, No 07/05, pp. 44-45, available on the 
Internet. 
33
 Case COMP/A.37.507/F3 - Astra Zeneca. See also Commission Decision of 26 July 1988 in Case IV/31.043 Tetra 
Pak II (OJ 1992 L 72/1), paras. 22 and 163-164. 
34
 See Commission Press Release MEMO/07/330, ‘Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections 
to Rambus’, for examples of and a definition of a ‘patent ambush’. 
35
 See Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia v Commission [1998] ECR II-2937, paras. 72-73; and Commission Press Release 
IP/12/345 - Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Motorola. 
36
 A more systematic outline of the use of competition law to correct problems in the IP system has been provided by 
Jens Schovsbo, Fire and Water Make Steam: Redefining the Role of Competition Law in TRIPS, 2009, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1339346; and by Francois Lévéque, Pharmaceutical Regulation and Intellectual Property: the 
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As isolated examples there is little to object to the legal arguments in each of the cited 
cases37 which are generally sound and support the use of competition law to 
supplement single market regulation. However, if considered in more detail the 
situation is more complex, particularly as the doctrine also covers ineffective 
regulation. This was an underlying reality of Deutsche Telekom, where the single 
market regulator failed adequately to remedy the margin squeeze despite the clear 
provisions of the single market regulation.38 Hence, the Commission could, and 
perhaps should, have dealt with the case by bringing proceedings against Germany 
for its failure to enforce Union legislation, and there are indications that this was the 
Commission’s initial intention.39 However, it was considered more appropriate to 
pursue the matter under competition law, thereby confirming the role of competition 
law as a corrective instrument. The same approach was used in GVG/FS40 (2003) and 
Swedish Interconnectors,41 (2010) where Article 102 TFEU was applied to distorting 
behaviour in the railway and electricity sectors respectively. In the first case against 
refusal to grant access to tracks and traction and in the second case to the periodic 
reduction of transmission capacity for reasons other than security of supply. As these 
situations were also governed by single market legislation42 the Commission could 
have taken action on this basis,43 but it favoured resorting to competition law. Thus, 
competition law’s role as a supplement to single market regulation potentially 
involves it being used to overrule regulatory shortcomings. This is not only a 
significant expansion of its role but also a potentially troublesome one. 
3.1. Competition law as a supplement single market regulation in the liberalisation of 
markets 
It is difficult to date the emergence of the role of competition law as a supplement to 
single market regulation or to assess its full scope. It could be seen as early as 
Grundig Consten, but it was not fully developed until later. The telecommunications 
sector is a prime example. Initially competition law was intended to play a secondary 
role in the liberalisation process, which was to be built around sector-specific single 
market regulation, probably because it was assumed that there were substantial 
lacunas in competition law. Nevertheless, almost from the outset the Commission 
relied heavily on competition law, for example liberalising part of the sector by 
limiting the use of exclusive and special rights pursuant to Article 106(3) TFEU. This 
step was initially opposed by the Member States but ultimately accepted in exchange 
for them having a level of involvement and influence.44 Additional substance was 
given to the role of competition law by Commission Guidelines in 1991 and a 
                                                                                                                            
Third Side of the Triangle, Working Paper 2009-03. Both these papers consider the nature of the problems in the IP 
systems, and both are available on the internet. 
37
 Other than the Verbändevereinbarung case which should be viewed against the specific legal and political 
circumstances governing the agreement and the underlying EC Directive.  
38
 See Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, recital 11.  
39
 Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 - Deutsche Telekom, paras 2-4. 
40
 Case COMP/37.685 - GVG/FS. 
41
 Case COMP/39.351 - Swedish Interconnectors. 
42
 Primarily Directive 1995/19/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the charging of infrastructure 
fees; and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity. 
43
 Or alternatively directly on applicable provisions in the TFEU, as noted in para. 43 of the decision. 
44
 See Pierre Larouche, Competition law and regulation in European telecommunications, Hart Publishing, 2000, pp. 
39-47. 
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Commission Notice in 1998.45 Not only did these detail the Commission’s view of 
how competition law should be applied to the telecommunications sector, but they 
also indicated that competition rules could be waived in favour of single market 
regulation.46 Deutsche Telekom can be seen in this context, especially if compared 
with the contemporary UK Network Sharing Agreement.47 In UK Network Sharing 
Agreement the Commission left open certain issues relating to a notified 
concentration as there was effective single market regulation available if such issues 
should arise. In the Commission’s 2008 Guidelines on non-horizontal mergers48 the 
same approach was articulated more clearly as a general principle under the Merger 
Regulation, establishing that further appraisal could be waived subject to the 
existence of other (non merger) remedies. Accordingly intervention was required in 
E.ON/MOL49‘(2006) in the absence of sufficiently strong regulatory deterrence but 
not in HFC Bank Plc/British Gas Trading Ltd50 (1997) following assurances from the 
national sectoral regulator.51 Thus as a supplement to single market regulation across 
sectors and activities, competition law appears to be subordinate to single market 
regulation when both are considered equally effective. 
3.2. The priority of single market regulation has ambiguities and a hint of industrial 
policy 
According to the priority rule identified above, competition law should only serve as 
a supplement to sectoral regulation when the sectoral regulation is either ineffective 
or non-existent. This rule makes sense in isolation, if for no other reason than because 
the single market regulation would presumably deal with most issues, leaving only 
those where a party suffers either from the absence of regulation or from ineffective 
regulation. Hence, competition law can be a fall-back position remedying problems 
not dealt with or inadequately dealt with in single market regulation. Thus, a 
hypothetical hindrance to competition should not be dealt with under the Merger 
Regulation if it provides adequate remedies, as such remedies should ensure that the 
hindrance to competition remains hypothetical. On the other hand elevating this 
priority rule to a general rule giving priority to single market regulation would be 
controversial. As demonstrated in Deutsche Telekom, and perhaps in GVG/FS and 
Swedish Interconnectors, any application of competition law to supplement 
ineffective regulation would be, if not arbitrary, at least subject to some ambiguity as 
it is ultimately a matter for the Commission to quantify the level of ineffectiveness 
and decide what is acceptable. Furthermore, resorting to the settlement of cases, as in 
Swedish Interconnectors and GVG/FS, not only circumvents the traditional 
 
45
 Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector, (OJ 1991 C 233/2); and 
Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector - 
framework, relevant markets and principles, (OJ 1998 C 265/2).  
46
 See para. 28 of the Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector. See also Faull & Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, 2nd Ed., Oxford 2007, pp. 1487 
and 1489-1490 for further on identifying ambiguities in Commission practice. 
47
 Case COMP/ 38.370 - O2 UK/T-Mobile UK (‘UK Network Sharing Agreement’), para. 104. See also case 
COMP/M.3695 BT/Radianz, para. 42; and case COMP/M.1439 - Telia/Telenor, para. 169, for evaluations of 
sectoral regulation. 
48
 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, para. 46. 
49
 Case COMP/M.3696 - E.ON/MOL, para. 433. 
50
 The Commission’s XXVII Report on Competition Policy (1997), pp. 130-131. 
51
 See Nicolas Petit, Circumscribing the Scope of EC Competition Law in Network Industries? A Comparative 
Approach to the US’, for further examples; available on the internet. 
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infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, thus depriving the courts of the 
opportunity to interpret Union law and the Member States to argue their case, it also 
gives the Commission a much more direct role in the national implementation of 
single market regulation. This direct role of the Commission would be particularly 
problematic if the single market regulation represents a compromise intentionally 
leaving certain issues unaddressed.52 Such compromises are not unknown in the 
liberalisation process where they can create situations in which the Commission may 
either have to ignore the Member States, or make its enforcement priorities subject to 
a more political agenda, or even take it to an extreme as in Verbändevereinbarung. 
Also, where the single market regulation adopted differs from the Commission’s 
initial proposal, any application of the priority rule, other than in clear cases, could be 
thought to be tainted by industrial policy if the Commission’s decision appears to be 
guided by its initial position. It could thus be argued that while competition law does 
not implement an industrial policy outright, the priority rule and its role as a 
supplement has a flavour of industrial policy. 
4. Competition law: the rock upon which the single market can be built 
Following France v Commission, the Commission was given a powerful competition 
law instrument, as the objective of the single market could now be pursued by using 
Commission directives c.f. Article 106(3) TFEU, circumventing the Council and the 
Member States. Commission directives were successfully used in the 
telecommunications sector, where competition law formed the core of single market 
regulation in the early years, but they were not so successful in the energy sector 
following setbacks at the hands of the Court of Justice and insufficient general 
support.53 Nevertheless, competition law emerged as more than a supplement to 
single market regulation as it could be the very rock upon which the single market 
was built. Competition law can offer principles and definitions; it can prepare a sector 
by removing distortions either prior to or in parallel with the application of sector-
specific single market regulation; and it can help identify problems and challenges to 
be remedied by single market regulation. These three aspects of competition law 
warrant further examination. 
4.1. Competition law as a source of principles and definitions 
Between 1988 and 1998 the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector was 
achieved through successive Commission directives adopted pursuant to Article 106 
TFEU. These initially limited and eventually abolished the use of special and 
exclusive rights in the sector. Many of the parallel Council directives, adopted by the 
Council under the normal single market provisions, either referred directly to terms 
defined by the Commission directives, such as ‘special and exclusive rights’, or they 
drew on general competition law principles, such as the concept of dominance or the 
 
52
 Directive 1996/92/EC (the first electricity directive) is a good example of this with its many options for national 
derogations, including derogations for grid access under the single buyer system (Article 18) or national regulation of 
the terms for grid access (Article 17). 
53
 See Susanne K Schmidt, Sterile Debates and Dubious Generalisations: European Integration Theory Tested by 
Telecommunications and Electricity, 16 Journal of Public Policy 1997, pp. 242-249. 
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obligation not to mix commercial and regulatory interests.54 Despite the decision to 
switch to using traditional single market regulation in the energy sector, the option of 
using Article 106 was never officially abandoned, giving the Commission some 
political leverage.55 Competition law principles and concepts have also played a 
pivotal role in the energy sector along the same lines as in the telecommunications 
sector, for example by governing the separation between commercial and regulatory 
interests or assessing the value of stranded costs as an alternative to derogations, 
despite there being provisions for derogations in the directive concerned.56 There are 
also examples of the use of definitions in energy regulation that are derived directly 
from competition law, such as the concepts of ‘vertical integrated undertaking’ and 
‘control’, as defined under the Merger Regulation.57 Also, across the two sectors the 
initial single market regulation did not call for the markets to be fully opened but 
allowed the Member States to reserve certain activities for the incumbent undertaking 
in order to ensure universal access to services and to pre-empt the use of Article 
106(2) TFEU. Hence, despite there being some differences in the role played by 
competition law in respect of telecommunications and energy, there are many 
similarities in the origins of the definitions, obligations and key concepts.  
 
From a broader perspective it becomes apparent that the uses of competition law 
principles, methodology and obligations are not isolated examples, limited to 
telecommunications and energy. In the course of the 1990s other sectors, including 
postal services, railways and air transport, underwent parallel transitions from 
monopoly markets to competitive markets, in which competition law plays a more 
prominent role than that of a supplement to single market regulation.58 For example, 
in the postal sector it is difficult to understand or apply the elaborate system of 
accounting requirements established by the single market Postal Services Directive 
unless they are viewed in the light of the concept of cross-subsidisation as defined in 
competition law.59 More important has been the use of competition law to control 
activities and sectors that are outside the scope of single market regulation,60 and the 
fact that the exclusion of activities from single market regulation61 was accepted for 
the purpose of universal service provision, thus pre-empting an Article 106(2) TFEU 
defence. Also, the establishment of independent postal authorities to supervise the 
 
54
 See Pierre Larouche, Competition law and regulation in European telecommunications, Hart Publishing, 2000, pp. 
3-36, for further on the use of competition law principles and concepts in the telecommunications sector up to the turn 
of the millennium. 
55
 See Susanne K Schmidt, Sterile Debates and Dubious Generalisations: European Integration Theory Tested by 
Telecommunications and Electricity, 16 Journal of Public Policy 1997, pp. 265-266.  
56
 The term ‘stranded costs’ refers to various forms of often long-term commitments which predate market 
liberalisation but which are difficult to honour subsequently. Article 24 of Directive 1996/92/EC (the first electricity 
directive) provided for derogations to deal with the issue of stranded costs. However, most Member States preferred the 
route of capitalisation under the State aid rules; see Faull & Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edition Oxford 
2007, pp. 1383-1384. 
57
 Directive 2003/54/EC (the second electricity directive), Article 2(21); and Directive 2009/72/EC (the third electricity 
directive), recital 13. 
58
 This role of competition law is even identifiable outside the newly liberalised sectors. E.g. Article 1(2) of Directive 
2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation refers to the creation of a ‘dominant position’ as an example of 
prohibited market manipulation. 
59
 See Damien Geradin & David Henry, ‘Regulatory and Competition Law Remedies in the Postal Sector’, in Damien 
Geradin (ed.): Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation, Intersentia 2004, 
pp. 133-134. 
60
 See Commission Decision of 21 December 2000 in relation to the provision of certain new postal services with a 
guaranteed day- or time-certain delivery in Italy (OJ 2001 L 63/59). 
61
 Under Article 7 of Directive 97/67/EC (the first postal directive), the sending of letters weighing less than 350 grams 
could be reserved for the incumbent service provider as a means of securing universal service. 
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obligations set out in single market postal regulation has been governed by 
competition law, calling on it in cases where there has been insufficient 
independence.62 Hence, the postal sector essentially followed the same path as the 
telecommunications and energy sectors where competition law and Article 106 
played a pivotal role in the liberalisation process. The initial single market regulation 
did not provide for a fully open market in either the postal sector or the railway 
sector, which compelled market entrants to enter into service agreements with the 
incumbent service provider in order to provide cross-border services.63 These service 
agreements were entered into against the background of competition law, which 
governed their terms and the obligation to negotiate in good faith. Deutsche Post II64 
(2001) and the already cited GVG/FS are examples of this.65 In Deutsche Post II the 
incumbent operator had effectively refused to accept that remail (mail collected by 
non-incumbents, exported and then re-imported) qualified as inbound cross-border 
mail which was liberalised by the single market regulation. A surcharge had been 
levied, services had been delayed and injunctions had even been obtained against 
undertakings offering remail services in Germany. In GVG/FS the incumbent railway 
operator had initially ignored and later stalled requests for negotiations for seven 
years,66 rendering the rights established by the Directive useless. In both cases the 
Commission was therefore compelled to use Article 102 TFEU to ensure that 
agreements were entered into as provided for in the single market regulation. While, 
due to the monopolistic nature of newly liberalised sectors, Article 102 plays a 
prominent role, Article 101 has also been applied in parallel manner. In the air 
transport sector access to listing in a computer reservation system was early identified 
as being essential for market access, as travel agencies relied heavily on such 
systems. This issue was therefore governed by a regulation67 and Article 101 applied 
to failures to comply with its principles, as demonstrated by London European - 
Sabena68 (1988) and British Midland v Aer Lingus69 (1992). Despite the differences 
in the legal instruments facilitating the liberalisation processes it could therefore be 
argued that the prevailing principles are essentially the same across the sectors. All 
calling on competition law to play an essential and central role. 
 
4.2. Competition law in preparing the way for the single market 
A new era of much closer interaction between competition law and the single market 
has been opened with the remedies used to clear concentrations and to close 
 
62
 See Commission Decision of 23 October 2001 on the lack of exhaustive and independent scrutiny of the scales of 
charges and technical conditions applied by La Poste to mail preparation firms for access to its reserved services (OJ 
2002 L 120/19). 
63
 Directive 97/67/EC (the first postal directive) differentiated between inbound and outbound mail, reserving inbound 
mail to the incumbent operator while outbound mail was fully liberalised. Likewise market access under Directive 
91/440/EC (the first railway directive) required the formation of an ‘international grouping’ between the incumbent and 
the market entrant. Direct market access without the incumbent operator was not allowed.  
64
 Case COMP/36.915 - Deutsche Post – Interception of cross-border mail. 
65
 See also case COMP/38.745 - BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG for an example of the application of Article 102 TFEU in a 
case of failure to conclude certain agreements provided for by single market regulation. 
66
 See case COMP/37.685 - GVG/FS, paras. 28-32, explaining how the initial request from 1992 had never been 
answered and the negotiations not handled professionally. 
67
 Currently Regulation (EC) No 80/2009 on a Code of Conduct for computerised reservation systems. 
68
 Case IV/32.318 - London European – Sabena (OJ 1988 L 317/47). 
69
 Case IV/33.544 - British Midland v Aer Lingus (OJ 1992 L 96/34). 
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investigations. The VISA I and VISA II decisions70 (2001) not only ended 25 years of 
Union concern with international payment cards but also struck a prudent balance 
between the different interest groups involved and, most importantly, the single 
market. An exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU was only granted after VISA 
agreed to reduce charges beyond what was required by the Regulation on cross-
border payments in euro,71 which is applicable only to cross-border transactions in the 
euro area. This was an important step, not merely because of the implied regulatory 
lacunas but also because most of the transactions affected would be domestic in 
nature and thus less obviously of Union interest. Hence, the Commission determined 
what could constitute an obstacle to the single market without “troubling” the 
Council. Competition law could help even where there was single market regulation. 
Regardless of a clear risk of preferential treatment and cross-subsidisation, the single 
market regulation might lack adequate pre-emptive remedies other than accounting 
separation and in some cases not even this modest instrument. Thus, there could be 
lacunas in the enforcement of provisions and principles which could allow 
infringements and other distortions to elude sanctions. Initially this problem could be 
addressed under competition law by requiring the parties to extend the terms and 
conditions applied internally to third parties, as demonstrated in TNT/GD Net72 
(1991) and in the Atlas and Phoenix/Global One (1996) cases.73 Furthermore, 
restrictions caused by delayed or insufficient national implementation of single 
market regulations could be remedied by requiring undertakings to refrain from 
entering into certain commercial affiliations with the parent group until opening of 
the market had been achieved, as demonstrated by the EDF/Louis Dreyfuss74 (1999) 
merger case in the energy sector. More elaborate solutions would become available 
once single market regulations were adopted. Mergers such as DHL/Deutsche Post,75 
(1998) Deutsche Post/ Securicor76 (1999) and Atlas and Phoenix/Global One were 
cleared by establishing separate accounts which were subject to external auditing. 
This was a remedy inspired by already adopted single market regulation, but which 
went beyond the obligations herein. In the energy merger VEBA/VIAG77 (2000) the 
remedies included an obligation to break down the prices for certain customers into 
network-use charges, energy prices, metering/reading etc., not only enhancing 
transparency and inhibiting cross subsidisation but in essence applying the accounting 
separation obligations already adopted to invoices.78 In time even more drastic steps 
were introduced as demonstrated by Neste/IVO79, Deutsche Post I,80 Telia/Sonera81 
 
70
 Case COMP/29.373 - Visa International, and case COMP/29.373 - Visa International - Multilateral Interchange 
Fee. For practical reasons the Commission split the case into two separate decisions. See Faull & Nikpay, The EC Law 
of Competition, 2nd Ed., Oxford 2007, pp. 1316-1326 for further on the case. 
71
 Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 on cross-border payments in euro. 
72
 Case IV/M.102 - TNT/Canada Post, DBP Postdienst, La Poste, PTT Post and Sweden Post. The same approach 
was used in case COMP/35.141 - Deutsche Post in order to close an Article 102 TFEU case. 
73
 Case 35.337 - Atlas (OJ 1996 L 239/23); and case IV/35.617 - Phoenix/Global One (OJ 1996 L 239/57). 
74
 Case COMP/M.1557 - Edf/Louis Dreyfuss (OJ 1999 C 323/11). 
75
 Case IV/M.1168 - DHL/Deutsche Post (OJ 1998 C 307/3). 
76
 Case IV/M.1347 - Deutsche Post/Securicor 
77
 Case COMP/M.1673 - VEBA/VIAG, para. 244. 
78
 According to Article 14(3) of Directive 96/92/EC (the first electricity Directive), separate accounts were to be kept 
for generation, transmission and distribution and submitted to the national regulator. 
79
 Case COMP/M.931 - Neste/IVO. 
80
 Case COMP/35.141 - Deutsche Post. In contrast to the other cases referred to, this case concerned an infringement 
rather than a merger. 
81
 Case COMP/M.2803 - Telia / Sonera. 
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and E.ON.82 In Neste/IVO, divestiture to a non-controlling level was held insufficient 
to prevent the risk of a vertical foreclosure by preferential treatment in the energy 
sector, unless supplemented by a commitment by the retained board members not to 
seek election as chairman. In Deutsche Post I and Telia/Sonera, separation of the 
activities and infrastructure in separate subsidiaries was introduced for undertakings 
in the postal and telecommunications sectors, thereby making transactions more 
transparent. In E.ON, an Article 102 TFEU case, not even separation of the 
infrastructure was considered sufficient to satisfy the Commission making divestiture 
of electricity infrastructure a requirement. Notable would also be the already cited 
Regulation on cross-border payments as the updated and expanded version83 required 
market actors to submit certain information to the Commission for the purposes of an 
updated Article 101 TFEU notice. However, as this requirement was not complied 
with, the Commission published a draft working paper84 (2009) indicating not only its 
determination to pursue cases regardless of the missing data, but that it would still be 
possible to influence the Commission’s understanding of the market by submitting 
the information requested. What makes these cases and the remedies applied notable 
is the implication of the existence of regulatory defects, not only in single market 
regulations but also in their enforcement and in the use of competition law to 
overcome these defects across various sectors including the postal, 
telecommunications, financial services and energy sectors. Hence, it can be seen that 
competition law has been used to give leverage to the enforcement of single market 
regulations. 
 
4.3. Mopping up imperfections and distortions 
Besides giving leverage to enforcement, there are also examples of competition law 
being used to deal with imperfections in underlying markets which hamper the 
development of the single market. The lack of transmission capacity is a significant 
obstacle to the internal energy market even when wholesale generation capacity is 
available. For this reason there has been particular interest in the pricing and 
principles for the allocation of capacity for international connections as a supplement 
to freeing up wholesale electricity capacity. In Dutch Transmission85 (1999) the 
Commission noted that Article 102 TFEU required national transmission charges to 
be cost-based, and separate charges for cross-border transmission should reflect 
actual costs which would normally only arise when electrons are moved, which is not 
necessarily the case when electricity is traded across a border. Further, in Irish 
Interconnector86 (1999) and UK/French interconnector87 (2001) it was held that the 
methods for allocating scarce capacity should be transparent and non-discriminatory 
 
82
 Case COMP/39.388 - German Electricity Wholesale Market; and COMP/39.389 - German Electricity Balancing 
Market. For a critical analysis of this decision see Malgorzata Sadowska, Energy liberalization in antitrust straitjacket: 
A plant too far, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2011/34. 
83
 Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 on cross-border payments in the Community, recital 11. 
84
 SEC 2009 1472 - Commission Working Document of 30 October 2009 on the ‘Applicability of Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty to multilateral interbank-payments in SEPA Direct Debit. 
85
 See Case IV/E3/37.770 - Electricity transmission tariffs in the Netherlands, summarised in the Commission’s 
XXIX Report on Competition Policy (1999), p. 165. 
86
 Case IV/E3/37.589 - Irish Interconnector, summarised in the Commission’s XXIX Report on Competition Policy 
(1999), pp. 165-166. The case related to gas but its principles can be applied to electricity. 
87
 Case COMP/E-3/38.012 - UK/France interconnector, summarised in the Commission’s XXXI Report on 
Competition Policy (2001), pp. 208-209. 
 14 
 
and that an auction therefore would be preferable. Swedish Interconnectors88 (2010) 
related to the same issue, as it was claimed that transmission capacity was wrongly 
withheld in order to reserve cheap electricity for Swedish consumers at the expense of 
Danish consumers. While there has been no actual case on it, it has even been 
suggested that Article 102 TFEU might be used where there has been insufficient 
investment in transmission capacity, if the lack of investment were part of a strategy 
intended to pre-empt new entrants.89 While this is a rather novel extension of the 
concept of abuse, it would not be entirely without precedent; c.f. e.g. Deutsche 
Bahn90(1997)  in which the link between the investments and the vertically integrated 
operator’s own downstream activities in the railway sector were noted but not 
condemned outright.91 Another notable energy case is Marathon92 (2001) where the 
Article 102 TFEU investigation was only suspended when the network owner gave a 
commitment not merely to accept third party access to a gas pipeline, but also to 
facilitate this by offering supplementary services. Hence, the network owner was 
obliged to actively facilitate the emergence of competition and not merely to refrain 
from impeding it. The Commission’s interest was so significant that it decided to 
pursue the case despite the original complainant having withdrawn their complaint. 
The remarkable leniency demonstrated in Verbändevereinbarung93 (1998) on a 
horizontal pricing agreement is probably due to its relation to grid access and the 
pivotal role played by this in the single energy market. Outside the energy sector, 
competition law has been used to ease access which is essential for facilitating the 
single market when bottlenecks and scarcity of resources have been eased across 
sectors such as railways,94 telecommunications,95 harbour infrastructures,96 air 
transport (slots),97 financial services98 and media.99 Many of the cases and sectors 
referred to could warrant comment, however the use of remedies to facilitate the 
emergence of new media services demonstrated in EUFA Champions League100 
(2003) is an excellent example of the novelty displayed in pursuing these cases. 
Having identified unexploited rights relating to football matches, the Commission 
moved on to conclude that the then exclusive allocation of rights did not have any 
 
88
 Case 39351 - Swedish Interconnectors.  
89
 See COM 2006 851 - the Commission staff working paper on the European gas and electricity sectors, paras. 157-
159. 
90
 Case T-229/94 - Deutsche Bahn v Commission [1997] ECR 1997 II-1689, paras. 87-93. 
91
 The strategy formed part of other and clearer infringements, e.g. discrimination, and was therefore neither 
condemned outright nor dealt with separately. On the other hand the Commission and General Court did find it relevant 
to refer to the issue. 
92
 Case COMP/E-3/36.246 Marathon, summarised in the Commission’s XXXI Report on Competition Policy (2001), 
pp. 207-208. See also Case COMP/M.2684 - EnBW/ EDP/Cajastur/Hidrocantabrico. 
93
 See the Commission’s XXVIII Report on Competition Policy (1998), pp. 156-159. 
94
 See case 32.490 Eurotunnel (OJ 1994 L 354/66); and case IV/34.518 ACI (OJ 1994 L 224/28). Both these cases 
relate to the Eurotunnel between the UK and France. 
95
 See e.g. case COMP/M 1439 Telia/Telenor, regarding access to the local loop; and case COMP/M.1760 
Mannesmann /Orange on access to mobile licenses and spectrums. 
96
 See Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 concerning a refusal to grant access to the facilities of the port of 
Rødby (OJ 1994 L 55/52).  
97
 See Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law, Cambridge 2007, pp. 476-478. 
98
 See case COMP/39.654 Reuters Instrument Codes (OJ 2012 C 204/44); and Commission Press Release IP/11/1354: 
Antitrust: Commission makes Standard & Poor’s commitments to abolish fees for use of US International Securities 
Identification Numbers binding. 
99
 See e.g. COMP/C.2-37.398 - Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League, COMP/37.214 
– BDF, COMP/M.2876 – NEWSCORP/TELEPIU and IP/03/1748 - Commission reaches provisional agreement with 
FA Premier League and BSkyB over football rights. 
100
 Case COMP/C.2-37.398 - Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League. 
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beneficial effects for the television broadcasting market.101 In the view of the 
Commission, it would be possible to exploit the rights by opening up for new services 
without damaging the interests of the existing users. The conclusion indicates that the 
Commission preferred to pursue allocative efficiencies directly rather than relying on 
competition to secure them. The accompanying press release explained that the 
decision would “give an impulse for the emerging new media markets”, and that 
‘barring access to key sport content [could have] stifled the development of sport 
services on the Internet and of the new generation of mobile phones. [which would 
not be] in the interest of broadcasters, clubs, fans and consumers”.102 The fact that 
the Court of Justice has traditionally given IP agreements strong protection against 
intervention under competition law appears either to have been forgotten or ignored, 
casting some doubt on the legal basis for identifying infringements in the first 
place.103 
 
In parallel with correcting of market imperfections, the Commission has also 
addressed the usual distortions of competition, though sometimes in a novel manner. 
While hardly qualifying as a U-turn, it appears that the approach to royalty collection 
societies has changed due to the single market agenda. Initially the focus was on 
ensuring that individual members could leave their royalty collection societies, as 
seen in the 1971 GEMA case.104 The approach later shifted to the end users’ 
perspective and their right to shop around and contract with the collection society 
offering the most attractive terms, as demonstrated by the IFPI ‘Simulcasting’105 
(2002) and Cannes Extension Agreement106 (2006) cases. It was argued that while 
cross-border licences were initially uneconomic due to gaps in enforcement, the 
emergence of the internet had changed this, thus warranting a new approach by the 
enforcer.107 However, that should not overshadow the former silence on the activities 
of royalty collecting societies and their system of national licensing and reciprocal 
representation agreements, in essence forming the core of the problem.108 Further, in 
the period between IFPI ‘Simulcasting’ and Cannes Extension Agreement the 
Commission’s Internal Market and Services Directorate General (DG Markt) issued a 
Recommendation on collective cross-border management109 (2005) outlining its view 
of licensing of music for internet-related activities. While initiatives prior to this 
recommendation had focused on ensuring the availability of online music services, 
 
101
 See paras. 19, 22-24 and 115-116. See also Nicolas Petit, The Commission’s Contribution to the Emergence of 3G 
Mobile Communications – an Analysis of Some Decisions in the field of Competition Law, p. 14, available on the 
internet. 
102
 Commission Press Release IP/03/1105: Commission clears UEFA's new policy regarding the sale of the media 
rights to the Champions League. 
103
 Some legitimacy can be found in previous cases e.g. case IV/31.734 Film Purchases by German Television Stations 
(OJ 1989 L 284/36), where reservations were expressed about a broad exclusive agreement covering the entire 
repertoire of MGM. It was considered unlikely that the broadcaster could use the entire repertoire and that the 
agreement could result in the suppression of rights and be detrimental to the interests of consumers. 
104
 Case IV/26.760 GEMA (OJ 1971 L 134/15), and the later case IV/29.971 GEMA, (OJ 1982 L 94/12). See also Case 
C-127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie v  SABAM and Fonior [1974] ECR 313, for the same approach. 
105
 Case COMP/C2/38.014 IFPI ‘Simulcasting’. 
106
 Case COMP/C2/38.681 The Cannes Extension Agreement. See also case COMP/39.151 SABAM and case 
COMP/C2/39.152 BUMA (‘Santiago Agreement’) (OJ 2005 C 200/11). 
107
 See COMP/C2/38.014 IFPI ‘Simulcasting’, paras. 14-16 and 61- 62. 
108
 For a discussion of the application of competition law to royalty collection societies see Lucie Gauibault & Stef van 
Gompel, Collective Management in the European Union, in Daniel Gervais (ed.): Collective Management of Copyright 
and Related Rights, 2nd ed., Kluwer Law International 2010, pp. 135-167. 
109
 Commission Recommendation of 18 May 2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related 
rights for legitimate online music services (OJ 2005 L 276/54). 
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the Commission went a step further by emphasising the authors’ right to choose 
between different royalty collecting societies, thereby in essence promoting the 
development of pan-European and/or specialised royalty collection societies at the 
expense of the existing national organisations. The principles of the Recommendation 
were put into effect in CISAC110 (2008) which concerned restrictions by a group of 
royalty collection societies on the right of IP owners to choose between different 
collection societies and preventing other collection societies from offering licences to 
commercial users outside a given territory.111  
 
Whether considered as a U-turn, a shift or merely new opportunities warranting a new 
approach, the publication of a Recommendation on the management of IP rights by 
one Commission Directorate General (DG Markt), followed by the bringing of 
competition law proceedings by another Directorate General (DG COMP) to enforce 
the principles of the Recommendation is somewhat unusual. Furthermore, the 
Recommendation was followed in 2008 by the establishment of the Online 
Commerce Roundtable to facilitate dialogue with industry stakeholders on the 
removal of barriers and the opening of internet business opportunities and, in the 
words of the Commissioner, how competition law could be clarified, updated or 
better enforced.112 While the Commissioner’s indication of willingness to change 
competition law is hardly to be taken literally, the opening up of a dialogue on 
enforcement priorities against serial infringers is somewhat unusual. Another novelty 
is that the use of competition law for dealing with imperfections and distortions is not 
limited to private or semi-private undertakings but in some cases has been extended 
to restrictions originated by government agencies. Lufthansa/SAS/United Airlines113 
(2002) ended with a package of commitments under which the German aviation 
authority agreed to stop exercising a form of indirect price control that was perceived 
as hampering market access by potential competitors. Also, part of the settlement in 
Swedish Interconnectors entailed restructuring the internal tariff and congestion 
management system in Sweden, as operated by the official national regulator.114 
Finally, the Commission’s decision in BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG115 (2004) was also 
addressed to Germany for having induced discriminatory distortion by national 
regulation. Traditionally, regulatory impediments would be handled under the 
relevant single market provisions, such as Articles 34 and 56 TFEU, or under 
applicable directives, but it can be seen that the Commission has occasionally relied 
on competition law. Once again little objection can be made to the individual cases as 
the arguments and considerations are generally sound. The prevailing pattern is 
nevertheless one in which competition law is used to remedy market imperfections, 
even against national regulations that distort competition, in order to improve the 
 
110
 COMP/C2/38.698 - CISAC. Part of the case where latter overturned by the General Court.  
111
 The members of CISAC were also considered to be engaging in a concerted practice dividing up the Union on the 
basis of national territories by restricting their internal licences to each member’s territory, thereby making them the 
only source of licences covering collection societies in each territory. 
112
 See Commission Press Release IP/08/1338: Competition: Commissioner Kroes hosts consumer and industry 
Roundtable on opportunities and barriers to online retailing and the European Single Market. For a presentation of the 
work of the Roundtable se Carlo Alberto Toffolon, The Online Commerce Roundtable – Advocating improved access 
to online music for EU consumers, Competition Policy Newsletter, DG COMP 2010-1, pp. 46-50. 
113
 Cases COMP/D-2/36.201, 36.076, 36.078 (OJ 2002 C 264/5). See also case COMP/M.3280 - Air France/KLM, in 
which the French and Dutch aviation authorities undertook to remove regulatory restrictions.  
114
 See also case COMP/M.1673 - VEBA/VIAG where merger remedies were used to address distortions created by the 
German decision not to regulate access to the grid but to refer these to commercial negotiations.  
115
 Case COMP/38.745 - BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG. 
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structures rather than merely safeguard against further impediments caused by 
imperfections in single market regulation.  
 
4.4. Competition law used to identify problems and challenges 
It is one thing to remedy problems or give leverage to enforcement against 
impediments, but it is another, equally important, thing to identify these in the first 
place. Over the years competition law has been used for this purpose in many cases. 
A notable feature of Swedish Interconnectors, perhaps driving the Commission’s 
desire for a quick settlement, was the concurrent adoption of sector-specific single 
market regulation largely addressing the issues involved.116 Hence, rather than seeing 
the case merely as an example of competition law being used to supplement single 
market regulation, it could also be viewed as an example of the use of competition 
law to identify shortcomings to be remedied by single market regulation. Other 
examples can be seen by comparing the cases of REIMS I117 (1995), REIMS II118 
(1999), successive industrial agreements in the postal sector, and the first Postal 
Services Directive119 adopted in between (1997). Not only did the parties in REIMS II 
wisely incorporate elements from the Directive directly into their notified agreement, 
it is also plausible to see the Directive as having been influenced by REIMS I.120 
Further, cases such as Verbändevereinbarung (1998) and VEBA/VIAG (2000) 
highlighted the problem of not having provisions on the pricing of grid access in the 
single market regulation. While initially addressed under competition law, the issue 
was subsequently incorporated directly into the next generation of single market 
regulations,121 illustrating how competition law cases can be used to explore the need 
for additional regulation. 
 
The use of competition law to identify remediable shortcomings can be seen in the 
cases referred to above, but it is much clearer in sector inquiries from the late 1990s 
and subsequently. While the number of cases originating directly from the sector 
inquiries has fluctuated, they often signal renewed Union interest in regulatory 
initiatives. The overhaul of telecommunications legislation early in the new 
millennium was preceded by four inquiries under competition law122 into issues such 
as pricing123 (1998), tariffs for leased lines124 (1999), roaming125 (2000) and access to 
the local loop126 (2000). This model has also been used for media127 (2005), energy128 
 
116
 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 was replaced by Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. Prior to this it had been updated by 
replacement of the Annex on congestion management in 2006. 
117
 Case IV/35.849 Reims. (OJ 1996 C 42/7). 
118
 Case IV/36.748 Reims II. 
119
 Directive 97/67/EC on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and 
the improvement of quality of service (the Postal Services Directive). 
120
 For further on REIMS I and II and the link with the Postal Services Directive, see Damien Geradin & David Henry, 
Regulatory and Competition Law Remedies in the Postal Sector, pp. 136-137, in Damien Geradin (ed.): Remedies in 
Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation, Intersentia 2004. 
121
 Directive 2003/54/EC (the Second Electricity Directive) did require the Member States to regulate grid access also 
in respect of pricing. 
122
 Pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 17/62 and Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the 
Commission can initiate general inquiries into a particular sector of the economy or into a particular type of 
agreement across several sectors. 
123
 See the Commission’s XXVIII Report on Competition Policy (1998), pp. 79-81. 
124
 See the Commission’s XXIX Report on Competition Policy (1999), pp. 74-76. 
125
 See the Commission’s XXX Report on Competition Policy (2000), pp. 159-160. 
126
 See the Commission’s XXX Report on Competition Policy (2000), pp. 155-156. 
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(2007), financial services129 (2007) and pharmaceutical services and products130 
(2009) in order to identify impediments to the single market regardless of their 
origins,131 regulatory gaps, market distortions or clearly inadequate national 
implementation. With the tabling of the latest inquiry, on the pharmaceutical industry, 
there was an announcement of new single market initiatives to correct some of the 
problems identified in the IP system, including a renewed attempt to introduce a 
community patent and a specialised patent litigation system.132 While a direct link is 
rarely articulated as clearly as with the pharmaceutical sector inquiry, it is 
nevertheless possible to see not only how the Commission uses sector inquires to 
identify problems and gain a better understanding of a sector, but also to gauge 
support for forthcoming initiatives, and sometimes even retabling old proposals. 
4.5. Competition law’s role as a basis comes packaged in an industrial policy agenda  
Despite the legal basis for allowing competition law to serve as the foundation upon 
which the internal market is built, the role is controversial. For example, the 
Commission’s Recommendation on collective cross-border Management in 2005, and 
the steps preceding it, were not warmly welcomed by either industry or the European 
Parliament.133 The reaction of the European Parliament in particular made it clear that 
it would be difficult to get traditional single market initiatives adopted, making 
competition law a more attractive instrument for the Commission as it does not 
require the involvement of the Council or the European Parliament. The CISAC case 
should also be seen in this context, indicating that the shift from soft to hard law was 
perhaps influenced by the Commission’s failure to ensure voluntary compliance and 
by a reasonable assessment of the chances of success via the European Parliament. In 
the light of this, it could said that the telecommunications and energy sectors have 
been subject to the reverse development, whereby the initial hard law approach has 
been replaced by a soft law approach, including involvement of the Member States 
and the Council following a shift in their attitudes to the adoption of single market 
regulation. The almost perverse stretching of competition law in 
Verbändevereinbarung in order to meet the requirements of the market is perhaps the 
clearest example of the remarkable leniency that is occasionally demonstrated, but it 
is definitely not an isolated case.134 Less controversial would be the application of the 
principles, concepts and obligations of competition law to single market regulation. 
Across the various sectors the establishment of independent national regulators to 
monitor national enforcement of single market regulation has largely been governed 
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by competition law. This development has mostly gone smoothly and without 
intervention from the Commission. However, Article 106 TFEU and the Commission 
are always there in the background should any Member States fail to ensure the 
required level of independence as defined by the Commission. However, regulatory 
gaps and lacunas may not be accidental and may be the result of a compromise 
required to ensure the adoption of a proposal. Also, when the Council accepts 
methodologies etc. drawn from competition law, it also accepts that their definition 
may be outside their control and subject to the Commission’s opinions and priorities. 
Once again it can be argued that while it does not constitute an outright industrial 
policy, when competition law serves as a basis for the single market it does have the 
flavour of industrial policy as the changes in the priorities and regulatory approach 
will inevitably appear to be subject to some level of arbitrariness rather than the 
consistent pursuit of economic welfare gains. 
5. Competition law as a driver of the development of the single market 
In addition to its role of adding leverage to the enforcement of single market 
regulation or inspiration for its structure, competition law has also driven the 
development of or changes to the single market, as indicated above. However, this is 
not limited to the removal of minor regulatory obstacles to the single market as 
demonstrated in Lufthansa/SAS/United Airlines or BdKEP/Deutsche Post, but has had 
a much broader role. For example, freeing up wholesale generation capacity has been 
an integral part of many energy mergers, thereby fostering competition from the 
bottom up. Further, the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector came about by 
the adoption of directives because Article 106 TFEU allows competition law to serve 
directly as regulation. Consequently, the role of competition law as a driver for the 
development of the single market and its regulation appears to take two forms, both 
creating a market where no market existed, and developing regulations applicable to 
the market. 
5.1. Developing a market from the ground up 
Transforming a market sector from a monopoly market to a competitive market is a 
process in which the first step entails the removal of legal restrictions and where the 
next has to be taken by the market players. While the telecoms sector largely brought 
about its own conversion following the lifting of legal barriers, fostering competition 
in other sectors has been more of a challenge from a Union perspective, even when 
there has been a sufficient level of political acceptance and adequate single market 
regulation. However, competition law has been a handy instrument in the process as 
its remedies can achieve more than merely preventing further impediments. One 
consistent remedy that has been used to clear airline mergers and alliances involving 
incumbent airlines has been the surrender of take-off and landing rights (slots) at 
airports,135 in order to ease market access for new entrants and foster competition. 
Similarly, broadcasting spectrum rights and generation capacity have been 
relinquished through commitments to foster competition at the wholesale level in the 
mobile communications and electricity sectors. This was initially mainly in order to 
clear concentrations, but more recently increasingly to close on-going investigations. 
 
135
 See also Giorgio Monti EC Competition Law, Cambridge 2007, pp. 476-478. 
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Further, in the telecoms sector concentrations such as Telia/Telenor136 (1999) and 
Telia/Sonera137 (2002) were cleared subject to the divestiture of a cable television 
network, which was the most viable alternative to the established infrastructure 
around the turn of millennium and thus a suitable instrument for inducing 
competition.  
 
The remodelling of a market can take various forms. It can take the simple form of 
reducing the duration or scope of an exclusive supply or use agreement, freeing up 
wholesale capacity or relinquishing control over a facility that restricts capacity. It 
need not even require rights to be relinquished but could be limited to abstaining from 
certain activities or affiliations which are considered problematic. The EDF/Louis 
Dreyfuss138 (1999) merger in the energy sector is an example of the latter as the 
acquirer (EDF) of a specialised electricity trading company undertook not to transfer 
the acquired know-how to France before the single market regulation had been fully 
implemented, here, reducing some of the competitive advantages.139 From many 
perspectives the energy sector offers a prime example of competition law being used 
to facilitate a market restructuring, as the Commission showed such a strong 
preference for settlement and contractual amendment between 1991 and 2012 that 
only one decision was adopted establishing that there had been an infringement,140 
despite the sector inquiry (2007) uncovering serious impediments and potential 
infringements. The recent E.ON case141 (2008) is a good example of this. While the 
case was brought on the grounds of possible market manipulation by the strategic 
withholding of production capacity and other aggravating infringements, it was 
eventually concluded with a traditional settlement. In other words, because of the 
divestment of generation and network capacity, there was no formal infringement 
decision on the issue of market manipulation. Consequently, competition law 
remedies have been actively used to break up market concentrations and settle cases 
in the liberalisation of the European energy market and other newly liberalised sectors 
and industries. 
5.2. Developing the regulation to be applied in the single market 
The use of competition law, and Article 106 TFEU, as an instrument in the 
development of single market regulation has already been referred to. However, the 
process is much wider and includes the ‘aggressive’ use of remedies in order to 
secure regulatory objectives, including the expansion of single market regulation. The 
Commission’s approach in the Atlas and Phoenix/Global One cases142 (1996) is an 
example of this, as the establishment of a telecoms joint venture between the 
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incumbent operators in Germany and France was considered problematic unless 
national laws were amended to limit the use of reserved rights. Hence, by using its 
power to grant exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission has forced 
national liberalisation beyond what was required by single market regulation. Also, as 
the Commission launched the idea of full liberalisation of the telecoms sector at the 
same time, the remedies would indirectly induce two significant members of the 
Council to take a more favourable view of such move. While it might not be fair to 
see a direct link between the cases and the Council’s acceptance of full liberalisation, 
eluding the perception is difficult. Hence, it could be argued that the Commission has 
occasionally used its power to scrutinise concentrations and infringements to put 
pressure on the Council to adopt proposed single market regulation.143  
 
The use of competition law remedies to develop single market regulation is notable 
for reasons other than those described above. The Commission has traditionally 
maintained that a concentration can only be assessed in the context of the distortions 
it creates.144 Pre-merger impediments outside the control of the parties are therefore 
in principle not held against them.145 This should also be the position under Article 
102 TFEU as dominance is not in itself prohibited. Nevertheless, the Commission has 
willingly also remedied also pre-existing dominant positions and there are no 
indications that such considerations have limited the measures taken by the 
Commission. Following the General Court’s ruling in EDP,146 (2005) which rejected 
the claim that the Commission had attempted to secure remedies aimed at liberalising 
the energy sector beyond what was required by single market regulation, it must be 
concluded that the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion when it considers 
remedies under the Merger Regulation. This is also the case when the Commission 
considers remedies in conjunction with parallel single market regulation which can 
result in commitments from undertakings which go beyond what is required under the 
regulation. The proactive use of competition law to advance the development of 
single market regulation is not limited to concentrations and merger remedies. The 
core of competition law, and the definition of infringements, has even been used in 
support of the single market agenda. In 1994 the Commission put forward a proposal 
for a directive147 on cross-border credit transfers, and in the following year a Notice 
on the application of competition law to cross-border credit transfers.148 The 
Directive149 was adopted in 1997 but later replaced by two regulations.150 As a 
supplement to the regulations the Commission has published a draft working 
document151 on the application of Article 101 TFEU to multilateral interbank-
payments. While it is natural to see a link where the Notice addresses issues on which 
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the Directive and the Regulations are silent, it is also plausible to see a more 
advanced interaction, as some of the obligations eventually incorporated in the single 
market regulation could have been advanced by competition law. In the same way the 
obligations pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 have been hammered out to supplement 
single market regulation in respect of postal services152 and telecommunications.153 
However competition law can be more than a supplement, as illustrated by the 
Commission’s approach to local loop unbundling154 in the telecom sector. This 
approach was first introduced as a Union instrument using commitments in the case 
of the Telia/Telenor155 (1999) merger, and it was later made a general obligation 
under Article 102 TFEU by the publication in 2000 of a Communication from the 
Commission156 and eventually secured by the adoption of a Regulation,157 same year. 
Hence, a significant regulatory objective could have been secured by competition law 
if the Council had refused or delayed the adoption of the Regulation. It could 
therefore be argued that the Commission sometimes indirectly presents the Member 
States with two options: either they can be actively involved in framing single market 
regulation, or the Commission can take action under competition law against what, in 
most cases, will be state owned and well connected undertakings. 
 
In the light of this, the 2008 E.ON case warrants a re-examination. While the case was 
initiated because there was a presumption of price manipulation by withholding 
strategic capacity, the case was concluded by the undertaking in question agreeing to 
divest itself of 20 % of its generation capacity and its transmission network. The 
purpose of divesting the transmission network was to improve the structure of the 
German wholesale electricity market by preventing preferential treatment. In the 
course of its investigations the Commission also identified a strategy to deter new 
investors in generation capacity. However, this allegation was never developed or 
explained beyond a few lines and it was probably only a secondary concern.158 While 
the commitment to divest generation capacity could be considered a natural and 
effective measure for addressing the ability to exercise market power, the network 
commitment was somewhat more far-reaching, not to mention the view that strategic 
investment could be an infringement. The case not only involved distortions 
identified on somewhat vague grounds, it was also concluded by the making of 
commitments that addressed more fundamental problems in the market. This does not 
invalidate either the analysis or the rationale of the Commission. Insufficient 
investment is unquestionably a serious impediment to the single market, while 
ownership unbundling is an equally serious benefit. So far, however, the Council has 
declined to promote further ownership unbundling despite the strong arguments made 
by the Commission. Thus the third energy package (2009), which was adopted to 
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address the impediments identified by the sector inquiry and which is currently being 
implemented, only provides for optional ownership unbundling. The E.ON case thus 
demonstrates how significant regulatory objectives can be achieved by means of 
competition law in situations where the Council has declined to advance an issue, 
perhaps placing it in the same category as the Atlas and Phoenix/Global One cases. 
 
The approach to IP rights also fits the prevailing pattern. For example, the 
examination of IP rights under competition law, and particularly refusals to grant 
licences, has mainly involved rights such as copyright and thus only IP rights that 
might not qualify as IP rights in the eyes of the enforcer.159 Without either rebutting 
or questioning this observation, a more adequate argument would be that competition 
law has primarily been applied to IP rights that are not subject to Union 
harmonisation. This would offer a new perspective on the Commission’s current 
interest in the pharmaceutical sector, the implied infringements identified in the sector 
inquiry and the current attempts to establish a community patent. In the light of this, 
the Recommendation on collective cross-border management (2005) and the CISAC 
(2008) case might also require reconsideration. In between the Recommendation and 
CISAC the Service Directive160 (2006) was finally adopted following prolonged 
negotiations. A notable feature of the Directive is the inclusion of IP rights, despite 
calls for their exclusion by the European Parliament, and the subsequent application 
of the Directive against national authorisations of royalty collecting societies.161 Steps 
that has caused considerably turbulence in the sector. If this leads to renewed interest 
in Union action, the long-term beneficiaries of the current uncertainty about the legal 
framework governing royalty collecting societies could be the Commission and the 
internal market project. A proposal for Union harmonisation was tabled in 2012, and 
fortune may favour the bold.162  
5.3. Using competition law to drive development has the flavour of industrial policy 
Introducing regulation via the backdoor of competition law has some less attractive 
side effects. While the adoption of a formal decision pursuant to Articles 101 or 102 
TFEU requires substantial analysis to be made, and the adoption of single market 
regulations by the Council and European Parliament demands equally persuasive 
arguments, the requiring of commitments to conclude cases under competition law is 
less stringent. In contrast to a formal decision or the promotion of new regulation, the 
Commission can conclude an investigation by accepting commitments on the basis of 
a preliminary assessment, thus in effect reducing the need to identify significant 
barriers to competition and the single market; the existence of a low level of 
competition and allegations of impediments will be sufficient and should be easy to 
find in a newly liberalised sector. Consequently, there are few if any legal barriers to 
the Commission initiating a case with the aim of obtaining a commitment from the 
parties. Also, even though the wording of Article 9 of the Enforcement Regulation163 
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restricts the Commission to accepting commitments that meet the concerns expressed, 
it is obvious that any commitment process will be subject to some negotiation 
between the enforcer and the potential infringer. This is a process that could in itself 
increase the perception that competition law has been reduced to a form of quasi-
regulation. The use of competition law to facilitate the implementation of the single 
market goes back some way and has not only involved remedies used to clear 
concentrations but also to deal with infringements under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
In this process the Commission has been active in giving guidance on the application 
of competition law by issuing a large number of notices and comments. While legal 
clarity is always desirable, this may nevertheless cement the perception that 
competition law plays an unusual role. Thus, using competition law to drive the 
single market comes with a strong flavour of industrial policy.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
While industrial policy has not been directly embraced under competition law, there 
are nevertheless clear indications that competition law has been used as part of a 
wider agenda. While arguments based on economic welfare may be the main 
considerations advanced under competition law, over the years a pattern has emerged 
whereby the Commission sometimes resorts to competition law to secure single 
market objectives. The Commission has done so not only in absence of single market 
regulation, but also in situations where it considers that single market regulation is 
either insufficient or imperfect. Hence, competition law has functioned as part of a 
wider and more political agenda under the single market, giving it at least a flavour of 
industrial policy. This not only creates a need for a more complex understanding of 
the interaction between competition law and single market regulation, it should 
perhaps also influence perceptions of the call for an industrial policy agenda under 
competition law. Rather than being an unwelcome move promoted by the Member 
States, it should rightly be seen as a logical step from the traditional special interest 
groups which are deprived of their ability to lobby the Council and the European 
Parliament when the Commission short circuits these. This does not make the bid 
more welcome or attractive, but it nevertheless puts it into the right perspective, 
making a call for an industrial policy an indirect consequence of the use of 
competition law in a quasi-regulatory role.  
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